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1. Introduction
Financial institutions that wish to 
use IRB (Internal Ratings Based) approa-
ches pursuant to the recommendations of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion as provided in the document titled "In-
ternational Convergence of Capital Measu-
rement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework", or simply Basel II, must cal-
culate the following risk parameters: Pro-
bability of Default (PD), Loss Given De-
fault (LGD), Exposure at Default (EAD) and 
Effective Maturity (M).
Central Bank of Brazil Communi-
qué No. 18.365 (2009) established the pre-
liminary guidelines for using these appro-
aches, and allows larger banks to use the 
advanced approach based on the internal 
rating of exposures according to their cre-
dit risk, that is, the Advanced IRB approa-
ch, to which the literature refers as A-IRB. 
Central Bank of Brazil Circular Let-
ter No. 3.581, dated March 8, 2012, addres-
ses the standards governing the use of in-
ternal credit risk systems. In practice, Cir-
cular Letter No. 3.581 tropicalized the con-
cepts of Basel II.
According to Carvalho and San-
tos (2009) the A-IRB approach requires the 
most sophisticated models and is therefore 
more complex than the other approaches 
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to identify a relevant sta-
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timation of the Loss Given Default (LGD) parameter at times of 
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that Basel II discusses.
Under A-IRB, Central Bank autho-
rized institutions will be able to used their 
own estimates for Probability of Default 
(PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), Exposu-
re at Default (EAD) and Effective Maturity 
(M), subject, at all times, to minimum cri-
teria set forth by the supervising authority.
LGD corresponds to the percen-
tage loss relative to total exposure at the 
time of default, and must be determined 
for every contract in the portfolio that is in 
default status. 
According to article 75 of Circu-
lar Letter no. 3.581 and to paragraph 468 
of Basel II, banks using the A-IRB method 
must estimate LGD parameters so that they 
cover a full economic cycle and are equal 
to or greater than the long-term weighted 
average of observed LGD percentages. 
According to Communiqué No. 
18.365 and Circular Letter No. 3.581, whe-
re the losses show cyclicality characteris-
tics, the LGD parameter must reflect perio-
ds of adverse economic conditions, a prac-
tice that is referred to in the literature as 
“downturn LGD”. 
Indeed, at times of economic do-
wnturn, obligors in arrears may have incre-
ased difficulty honoring their obligations, 
leading to higher loss rates for banks’ por-
tfolios. In this case, the mean historic LGD, 
which may include a previous period of 
“economic normalcy”, will not provide an 
accurate indicator of the future losses fa-
ced as an adverse period arises, and will, 
in fact, underestimate the portfolio’s real 
loss potential.
It is during recessive periods that 
both retail and wholesale loan portfolios 
face their greatest rates of default: as the 
economic scenario deteriorates, it may 
compromise obligors’ capacity to honor 
their debts.
Therefore, during economic down-
turns, a portfolio’s loss rates may be gre-
ater than during normal periods, and the 
portfolio’s downturn LGD must reflect this 
volatility.
Circular Letter No. 3.581 addres-
sed this point explicitly, as it provides that 
LGD estimates must be more conservative 
in the presence of a relevant positive cor-
relation between the frequency of default 
and the magnitude of LGD.
Given the above, calculating a do-
wnturn LGD is justified because, in al-
most every case, the LGD obtained from 
the historic average of recovery rates may 
not be independent from rates of default, 
requiring an added penalty for LGD esti-
mates for the duration of economic down-
turn periods.
In light of the foregoing, this 
paper’s research problem is to propose 
a downturn LGD for a Retail Home Equi-
ty portfolio that can reflect added conser-
vatism at times when default rates are on 
the rise.
Section 2 analyzes an overview of 
the available literature on rates of recovery 
and rates of default. Section 3 shows the 
application of the methodology developed 
in the literature to calculation of a down-
turn LGD. Finally, Section 4 presents the 
paper’s conclusions.
2.Literature Review 
The academic studies reviewed 
show that economic adversity and periods 
of high default imply greater expected los-
ses. It is therefore a mistake to regard LGD 
as independent from rates of default (RD) 
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and use only the long-term average LGD to 
estimate the portfolio’s future LGD.
The conservatism supervisors re-
quire in connection with LGD estimates, 
according to Altman and Ssabato (2005), is 
due to the fact that Pillar 1 capital require-
ments under Basel II are highly sensitive to 
the magnitude of LGD, particularly as con-
cerns retail asset classes. Therefore, requi-
ring the calculation of a more conservati-
ve – downturn – LGD is intended to make 
sure that capital requirements accurately 
reflect the capital needed to face unexpec-
ted losses arising from credit portfolio ex-
posures over long periods of time.
Most of the academic studies on 
the dependence between the behavior of 
LGD and variables indicating economic 
downturns analyze data for debt issued by 
large businesses. For example, Altman et 
al. (2005) examine the rates of recovery of 
corporate obligations in 1982-2002 to con-
clude that macroeconomic variables do 
answer for a small part of the variation in 
rates of recovery.
Arguments for evidence of de-
pendence between the recovery of de-
faulting exposures and variables associa-
ted with recessive economic conditions 
can be found in Frey (2009), where the au-
thor shows that, during recessions, the re-
covery of defaulted obligations is around 
30% lower than during periods of econo-
mic growth. His study, however, also exa-
mines American corporate bonds, where 
a high correlation between default and re-
covery can be found.
Basel Committee 2005 document 
“Guidance on Paragraph 468 of the Fra-
mework Document” helps banks interpret 
paragraph 468 of Basel II as concerns the 
demand for downturn LGD.
The document describes the pro-
cess to be followed to evaluate the poten-
tial effects of worsening economic condi-
tions on recovery rates. According to the 
guidelines, the first step is to identify a his-
toric period that can be characterized as a 
period of economic downturn.
One understanding that can be de-
rived from the document is that, if the reco-
very rates observed during the periods of 
highest defaulting are lower than the ave-
rage long-term rates of recovery, there is a 
potential for increased losses in periods of 
rising default. Therefore, failing to adopt a 
conservative LGD estimate for this period 
may underestimate the capital needed to 
cover unexpected losses.
We thus conclude that the appro-
priate approach to identify a period of eco-
nomic decline must be based on tracking 
the historic observed rates of default and, 
as a result, periods in which historic obser-
ved rates of default are high will be then 
associated to a specific period of econo-
mic downturn for each credit portfolio.
Our review of the literature reve-
aled a single article that uses data for re-
tail assets: Sabato (2009). According to 
the author, it was the first study that pro-
posed to analyze the ties between rates of 
recovery and an economic downturn for 
this asset class. 
In the paper’s results, the author 
showed a high and positive Pearson corre-
lation coefficient of .77 between LGD and 
default rates. The correlation was obtained 
using data from a portfolio of products ca-
tegorized, as per Basel II, as Other Retail 
Exposures - ORE.  
On the other hand, in the same 
study, the author demonstrated the ab-
sence of significant correlation between 
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 variables in retail portfolios of products ca-
tegorized as Qualified Revolving Exposu-
res (-.84) and in Exposures to Small and 
Medium Enterprises (-.12), suggesting that 
these two asset classes do not require cal-
culation of a downturn LGD.
Identification of a statistical con-
nection between two variables may not es-
tablish a casual tie between them. In this 
paper, we use a method supported by the 
literature and known as the Granger Cau-
sality Test, which allows finding a cau-
sal link (or temporal precedence) between 
any two variables, in the sense that varia-
ble X Grange-causes variable Y if the ob-
served X in the present or past helps pre-
dict the future values of Y for a given hori-
zon (GRANGER, 1969).
Within the context of this paper, if 
the granger RD causes LGD, then chan-
ges in RD must precede changes in LGD 
over time. 
However, the two variables must 
be stationary, as the stationary condition is 
crucial to application of the Granger causa-
lity test (GUJARATI, 2004).
Data constraints are a significant 
challenge in estimating LGD parameters 
in general and downturn LGD parameters 
in particular. Furthermore, there is no cer-
tain, supervisor-provided, methodology in 
terms of what methods are appropriate for 
conservative estimates of LGD under eco-
nomic downturn conditions.
Therefore, according to the me-
thod proposed in Sabato (2009), we regard 
an economic downturn as a minimum pe-
riod of six months during which the obser-
ved rate of default is consistently higher 
than the long-term historic rate plus one 
standard deviation.
The extent to which potential 
 dependence between the rates of default 
and LGD will imply increased conserva-
tism in A-IRB models may vary significan-
tly from one financial institution to another, 
given that the methodologies take internal 
databases into consideration for the pur-
poses risk-parameter calculation.
Therefore, the purpose of this stu-
dy – that is, to calculate downturn LGD ba-
sed on historic data for the Home Equity 
Retail sub-class, is to make sure that LGD 
includes future predictions of loss rates re-
lative to the risks that increased defaulting 
may create.
3. Methodology
The method proposed above to 
calculate downturn LGD consists of iden-
tifying the period of economic downturn 
and then calculating how much, in percen-
tage terms, loss given default increases re-
lative to periods of lower-than-average ra-
tes of default.
Illustrating the method with data 
from Other Retail Exposures, as in Saba-
to (2009), the economic downturn period 
showed an average 17% increase in LGD 
for the category relative to the period in its 
entirety. This factor must be added to the 
portfolio’s LGD to increase the variable’s 
conservatism for the period of deteriora-
ting economic conditions, that is, when the 
frequency of default starts rising to above-
-average levels.
This paper adopted the downturn 
LGD development model proposed in Sa-
bato (2009) and applied the technique to 
Home Equity Retail exposures of a major fi-
nancial institution active in the domestic fi-
nancial market.
The LGD database consisted of 
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monthly observed LGD data for the pe-
riod from January 2008 to November 2011 
(see graphic 1). The rate of default da-
tabase was obtained from the Central 
Bank of Brazil Website and comprehend 
the same period, that is, January 2008 to 
November 2011.  
The .71 correlation between loss 
given default and the rate of default is sig-
nificant for the purposes of the study. 
48
3.1. Granger Causality
Test for RD and LGD
Although a strong Pearson corre-
lation exists between the variables invol-
ved in our study, this alone does not mean 
that a causal tie is present, that is, that an 
increase in RD in a certain period does 
affect the increase in LGD in a subsequent 
period.
The Granger Causality test is a 
VAR model, that is, a Vector Autoregressi-
ve model that examines linear relationships 
between each variable and the lagged va-
lues of itself and every other variable. Such 
models consider the presence of interde-
pendence between variables and may as-
sess the dynamic impact of random dis-
turbances on the variables system, which 
makes them particularly useful and effi-
cient in predicting the future behavior of 
interrelated time series (CAIADO, 2002).
The stationary condition of the RD 
and LGD series is crucial to application of 
the Granger Causality Test method for the 
purposes of capturing causal ties betwe-
en the variables. It is important to point out 
that if a series displays a unit-root, then it is 
non-stationary.
The analyses show that LGD does 
have a unit-root, that is, is non-stationary. 
On the other hand, RD is stationary, as it 
lacks a unit-root. However, given the cons-
traints of the data period, we decided not 
to develop vector models based on the 
cointegration of the variables. 
Assuming LGD to be stationary, 
the results we found using Eviews 5 and 
adopting a 5% significance level for each 
of the two tests, is that LGD causes RD 
(for 5 lags).
This means that today’s changes 
in LGD will affect RD in 5 periods, that is, 
today’s RD is impacted by the LGD from 5 
periods ago, at a 5% significance level.
3.2. Economic
Downturn Period
As noted, the approach to identi-
fying a period of economic downturn will 
be based on historic observed rates of 
default.
We therefore considered a period 
of economic downturn to be a minimum 
period of six months during which the ob-
served rated of default is consistently hi-
gher than the historic long-term rate plus 
one standard deviation.
Give the information from our data-
base, the period from January 1208 to Au-
gust 2008 show rates of default in excess 
of 2.99%, which is the historic average plus 
one standard deviation. Therefore, this pe-
riod will be regarded as a period reflecting 
adverse economic conditions.
3.3. Expected Average
Increase in LGD
 More conservatively, the 
average expected increase in LGD may be 
calculated as the relationship between the 
downturn period’s weighted average LGD 
plus one standard deviation and the avera-
ge LGD of the period of lowest rates of de-
fault minus one standard deviation.
Our result is an LGD that is 7.73% 
higher during recessive periods than in 
periods of low defaulting. This implies an 
LGD that is 2 percentage points higher.
In this case, the formula for the se-
lected portfolio would be:
dLGD1= 0.02 + ELGD (graphic 3)
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On the other hand, according to a 
slightly less conservative view, the average 
expected increase in LGD may be calcula-
ted as the relationship between the down-
turn weighted average LGD plus one stan-
dard deviation and the average LGD for the 
entire period minus one standard deviation.
In this case, the result is an LGD 
that is 7% higher during recessive perio-
ds than for the portfolio’s entire period. 
This implies an LGD that is 1.83 percenta-
ge point higher.
In this case, the formula for the se-
lected portfolio would be:
dLGD2= 0.0183+ ELGD (graphic 3)
4. Conclusion
This paper investigated a methodo-
logy that adds conservatism to LGD estima-
tes at times when the beginning of an eco-
nomic downturn is perceived.  We developed 
a methodology that has been established for 
retail portfolios, but had never been applied 
to a Home Equity Retail portfolio.
Despite the high statistical correla-
tion between RD and LGD, we cannot, ba-
sed on the statistical tools available, claim 
that the period marked by an economic do-
wnturn, that is, the period in which rates of 
default follow a rising path, may have a fu-
ture impact on increased economic losses 
arising from defaults.
However, despite not having found 
that RD Granger-causes LGD, LGD must 
even so, as per the Central Bank’s recom-
mendations, be more conservative in perio-
ds when default begins to rise. This paper 
attempted to determine how much more 
conservative we should be by applying an 
added penalty to estimations of LGD.
We therefore tried to meet the 
Central Bank of Brazil’s requirements for 
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the LGD estimates used in A-IRB. For futu-
re and supplementary studies, we suggest 
calculating more conservative metrics for 
portfolios where a significant correlation 
and time causality exist between rates of 
recovery and collateral value, since, if such 
a relationship can be found, the deteriora-
tion of collateral values will bring about a 
potential increase in default-related losses 
and, consequently, in LGD.
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